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NOTES
employee acting, and was it with the intention of serving the pur-
poses of the employer.2'1
In the instant case, the court practically disregarded the re-
quirement that, in order to impose liability upon a corporation,
the act of its agent must be within the scope of employment as
well as in the course thereof. As was said in Comfort v. Monte-
leone:2 2 "If an employee whose duties are limited to peaceful
functions undertakes to perform Others of a different character
... the master is not responsible. .. ." The defendant company
in the principal case could not have contemplated that their sales-
man would so far depart from his peaceful duties as to slander
the salesman of a rival company. Undoubtedly, the company did
not intend to authorize its agent to defame. Liability should not
be imposed for abnormal acts of the agent or for an act committed
by the agent with no intention to perform it as a part of, or inci-
dent to, a service on account of which he was employed.23.
F. H. O'N.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION UNDER NON-RESIDENT MOTOR-
IST STATUTE DOES NOT EXTEND TO AGENT-A non-resident corpora-
tion was sued for an injury caused by the negligent operation of
its automobile by its agent. Substituted service was made upon
the Secretary of State of Illinois under a statute' which provided
that the operation by a non-resident of a motor vehicle within the
state shall be deemed an appointment of the Secretary of State as
attorney for the service of process. Held, that the statute should be
construed strictly, confining its operation to cases in which the
vehicle is personally operated by its non-resident owner, and
that operation by an agent of the non-resident corporation is not
such "personal" operation. Jones v. Pebler, 16 N.E. (2d) 438
(Ill. App. 1938).
21. See McDermott v. American Brewing Co., 105 La. 124, 126, 29 So. 498
(1901).
22. Comfort v. Monteleone, 163 So. 670, 672 (La. App. 1935).
23. 1 Restatement, Agency (1933) § 235. In Comfort v. Monteleone the
court said: "An employee is never vested with authority to exercise force In
the venting of personal animosity." (163 So. at 673). See 13 A. L. R. 1142 (1921)
(Liability of insurance company for libel or slander by its agents or em-
ployees); and Comment (1936) 20 Minn. L. Rev. 805 (discussion of existing
jurisprudence regarding a master's liability for defamation published by ser-
vant, and a suggested solution of certain problems).
1. Ill. Rev. Stats., c. 95%, § 23,
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. I
Although non-resident motorist statutes have frequently been
subjected to litigation wherein violation of the due process clause2
and the privileges and immunities clause3 of the Federal Consti-
tution is alleged, the courts have unanimously held such statutes
constitutional.4 The basis of jurisdiction over non-resident motor-
ists lies in implied consent; the explanation of their constitution-
ality is founded upon the theory that to require the non-resident
motorist to "consent" to service upon a statutory agent is a rea-
sonable exercise of the police power of the state whose highways
the non-resident motorist uses.6 It should be remembered that the
statutes must contain provisions for notification reasonably cal-
culated to inform the defendant of the pending action,7 otherwise
the judgment obtained thereunder would be a nullity, as a denial
of "due process of law.""
Courts have been practically uniform in their unwillingness
to construe non-resident motorist statutes liberally.9 In spite of the
well-known doctrine that the act of the agent within the scope of
his authority is the act of the principal, the rule of the instant case
that the words "operation by a non-resident" refer only to per-
sonal operation of the motor vehicle by the non-resident owner is
2. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
3. U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 2.
4. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 S.Ct. 30, 61 L.Ed. 222 (1916); Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927); Hartley v. Vitiello,
113 Conn. 74, 154 Atl. 255 (1931); Schilling v. Odlebak, 177 Minn. 90, 224 N.W.
694 (1929); Ashley v. Brown, 198 N.C. 369, 151 S.E. 725 (1930); State v. Belden,
193 Wis. 145, 211 N.W. 916, 57 A.L.R. 1218 (1927). See Stumberg, Conflict of
Laws (1937) 92-95.
5. 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) 359, § 84.2; Restatement, Conflict of
Laws (1934) §H 81-94. See Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 S.Ct. 553, 79
L.Ed. 1097 (1933), discussed in Goodrich, Conflict of Laws Since the Restate-
ment (1937) 23 A.B.A.J. 119.
6. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 S.Ct. 30, 61 L.Ed. 222 (1916); Hess
v. Pawloskl, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927); Galloway v. Wyatt
Metal & Boiler Works, 189 La. 837, 181 So. 187 (1938); Spearman v. Stover, 170
So. 259 (La. App. 1936); Schilling v. Odlebak, 177 Minn. 90, 224 N.W. 694 (1929).
7. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927).
8. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259, 72 L.Ed. 446, 57 A.L.R.
1230 (1928); Spearman v. Stover, 170 So. 259 (La. App. 1936); Restatement,
Conflict of Laws (1934) § 75 and Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Louisiana An-
notations (1937) § 75. Cf. Charry v. Heffernan, 182 So. 427 (Fla. 1938).
9. Day v. Bush, 18 La. App. 682, 139 So. 42 (1932); Schilling v. Odlebak,
177 Minn. 90, 224 N.W. 694 (1929); O'Tier v. Sell, 252 N.Y. 400, 169 N.E. 624
(1930). Contra: Salzman v. Attrean, 142 Misc. 245, 254 N.Y. Supp. 288, 290
(Munic. Ct. 1931): "This law is one of general scope, being directed to a
matter of procedure, and, being remedial In character, is to be liberally,
rather than rigidly, construed." See also, Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 53 S.Ct.
599, 77 L.Ed. 1158 (1933), where the non-resident lender of an automobile was
held liable, although, by the law of the state in which the loan was made, he
would have been exempt from liability for the borrower's negligence.
1939] NOTES
well supported by authority. 0 It is, nevertheless, submitted that
such a strict construction is unfortunate in that it disregards the
true intent of the law-makers and the public policy which
prompted these enactments. A liberal construction of such stat-
utes should particularly be applied where the non-resident owner
is a corporation, because a corporation can act only through its
agents and servants." To hold that the non-resident owner must
personally operate the motor vehicle clothes the corporation with
judicial immunity from substituted service under the non-resi-
dent motorist statutes. Any but a liberal construction defeats the
purpose for which such statutes are enacted-for the same reasons
of public policy exist in the case of a corporation as that of any
other non-resident owner. 2
The Louisiana non-resident motorist act,13 prior to its amend-
ment in 1932,1' was much broader in scope than the Illinois Act"
in the principal case, in that the Louisiana statute includes a "non-
resident or his authorized chauffeur." Nevertheless, the same
strict construction has been applied to it, and the word "chauffeur"
was held to be used in a narrow sense and to have no application
to an agent operating his employer's automobile within the scope
of his employment. 6 In the following session of the legislature
the word "chauffeur" was changed to "employee, 1" and the Su-
preme Court immediately leaned toward the much needed liberal
construction. 8
10. Morrow v. Asher, 55 F. (2d) 365 (N.D. Tex. 1932); Brown v. Cleveland
Tractor Company, 265 Mich. 475, 251 N.W. 557 (1933); Flynn v. Kramer, 271
Mich. 500, 261 N.W. 77 (1935); O'Tier v. Sell, 252 N.Y. 400, 169 N.E. 624 (1930).
See in particular Jones v. Newman, 135 Misc. 473, 239 N.Y. Supp. 265 (1930).
11. Poti v. N.E. Road Mach. Co., 83 N.H. 232, 140 Atl. 587 (1928); Bessan
v. Public Service Co-ordinated Transport, 135 Misc. 368, 237 N.Y. Supp. 689
(1929); Bischoff v. Schnepp, 139 Misc. 293, 249 N.Y. Supp. 49 (1930).
12. See cases cited in note 6, supra.
13. La. Act 86 of 1928.
14. La. Act 184 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1932) H§ 5296-5298].
15. Ill. Rev. Stats., c. 95%, § 23, cited in note 1, supra.
16. Day v. Bush, 18 La. App. 682, 139 So. 42 (1932).
17. La. Act 86 of 1928, as amended by La. Act. 184 of 1932 [Dart's Stats.
(1932) §§ 5296-5298]; in Brassett v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 153
So. 471 (La. App. 1934), it was held that the word "employee" did not cover
a gratuitous bailee.
18. In Galloway v. Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works, 189 La. 837, 181 So. 187
(1938), it was held that the term "public highways" as employed in the 1928
act, as amended, is broad enough to include every way for travel by persons
on foot or with vehicles which the public has the right to use: "Courts are
not required to construe, and will not construe, a statute so as to defeat its
purpose or to produce a result that is not within the legislative intent. On
the contrary, the courts will construe a statute so as to accomplish the pur-
pose for which it was enacted and to give effect to the legislative will." (189
La. at 845, 181 So. at 189).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Although incorporated under the laws of another state, a non-
resident corporation, that has complied with all the statutory re-
quirements relative to doing business in Louisiana and has ap-
pointed an agent upon whom service of process may be made,"9
becomes a "domestic" corporation as contradistinguished from a
"foreign" corporation.20 Therefore, such a corporation would not
be a "non-resident" within the intendment of the 1928 act (as
amended) and service of process would be made upon the agent
appointed by the corporation, or upon the Secretary of State (if
the agent so appointed should have removed from the state, or
died) .21
In order to avoid strict constructions by the courts, other
states have amended their original laws and have extended the
application of the statute to others than operators.2 2 It is unfor-
tunate that, in their present attitude, the courts persist in inter-
preting non-resident motorist statutes so narrowly as to defeat the
legislature's evident intent to make all who use the roads of the
state, whether residents or non-residents, amenable to suit within
the state for injuries occasioned within its borders. The argument
that non-resident motorist statutes are in derogation of common
laW22 or of "common right"2' is merely a judicial device the result
of which is to hamper effective regulation by the state of a uni-
versally recognized evil. It is submitted that, with the constitu-
tional safeguards adequately provided for, there is no longer any
reason why statutes providing for substituted service of process
should not be liberally construed. If they are not, we shall con-
tinually witness the unfortunate spectacle of the legislature being
forced to correct one narrow decision after another.
J. B.
19. La. Act 267 of 1914, § 23, as amended by La. Act 120 of 1920, § 1 [Dart's
Stats. (1932) § 1246).
20. Burgin Bros. & McCane v. Barker Baking Co., 152 La. 1075, 95 So. 227
(1922).
21. La. Act 184 of 1924, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1252]. Cf. State v. Ameri-
can Ry. Express Co., 159 La. 1001, 106 So. 544 (1924); State v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 171 La. 1088, 133 So. 166 (1931).
22. La. Act 86 of 1928, as amended by La. Act 184 of 1932 [Dart's Stats.
(1932) §§ 5296-5298] (operation by a non-resident or his authorized employee);
Minn. Acts (1933), c. 351, § 4 (any operator other than the owner, with the
express or implied consent of the owner shall in case of accident, be deemed
the agent of the owner); Tenn. Code (Williams 1934) § 8671 (any owner,
chauffeur or operator).
23. Morrow v. Asher, 55 F. (2d) 365, 367 (D.C.N.D.Tex. 1932).
24. Day v. Bush, 18 La. App. 682, 684, 139 So. 42, 44 (1932); Spearman v.
Stover, 170 So. 259, 262 (La. App. 1936). "Derogation of common right" is
nothing more than a maxim which is an expansion of the "derogation of com-
mon law" doctrine at common law and has no place in Louisiana jurispru-
dence. "Derogation of common law" is fundamentally common law and arose
[Vol. I
